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Abstract The Proviso Problem is the discrepancy between the predictions
of nearly every major theory of semantic presupposition about what is
semantically presupposed by conditionals, disjunctions, and conjunctions,
versus observations about what speakers of certain sentences are felt to be
presupposing. I argue that the Proviso Problem is a more serious problem
than has been widely recognized. After briefly describing the problem and
two standard responses to it, I give a number of examples which, I argue,
show that those responses are inadequate. I conclude by briefly exploring
alternate approaches to presupposition that avoid this problem.
Keywords: proviso problem, presupposition, presupposition projection, accommo-
dation, pragmatic strengthening, independence
1 Introduction
Nearly every current theory of semantic presupposition predicts that the
strongest semantic presupposition of a conditional with the form
(1) If p then qr .1
* I am grateful to Danny Fox and Irene Heim for invaluable feedback on this paper. I am
also grateful to audiences at MIT and the ‘Going Heim’ conference at the University of
Connecticut, two anonymous reviewers for Semantics and Pragmatics, David Boylan, Cleo
Condoravdi, Nilanjan Das, Kai von Fintel, Cosmo Grant, Samia Hesni, Matthias Jenny, Justin
Khoo, Milo Phillips-Brown, Kevin Richardson, Daniel Rothschild, Ginger Schultheis, Robert
Stalnaker, Stephen Yablo, and Martín Abreu Zavaleta for very helpful discussion.
1 Subscripts indicate the semantic presuppositions of atomic presupposition bearers. Ro-
man letters and strings stand for sentences, and italic letters and strings stand for the
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is the material conditional
(2) p ⊃ r.
It is well known that this prediction does not line up neatly with observa-
tions about what someone who asserts a conditional with the form of (1) is
often felt to be presupposing. For instance, someone who asserts
(3) If Theo hates sonnets, then so does his wife.2
is felt to presuppose
(4) Theo has a wife.
However, most current theories of presupposition predict that (3) semanti-
cally presupposes just the material conditional
(5) Theo hates sonnets ⊃ Theo has a wife.
rather than the unconditional (4). Similar patterns arise for semantic presup-
positions triggered in right disjuncts and conjuncts.
The discrepancy between the predicted conditional semantic presup-
position of a sentence like (3) and the unconditional proposition which a
speaker of a sentence like (3) is felt to presuppose is known as the Proviso
Problem.3 This problem was recognized early in the development of theories
of presupposition that make the relevant conditional predictions,4 and a fair
amount of recent work has aimed to address it. Although there are differ-
ences in detail, almost all of that work pursues the same general strategy:
a sentence like (3) semantically presupposes the conditional (5), but, on the
basis of pragmatic reasoning, interlocutors conclude that a speaker of a
sentence like (3) is pragmatically presupposing something stronger, namely,
the corresponding unconditional (in this case, (4)). Some of that work further
corresponding propositions. Sentences presuppose other sentences (or propositions) seman-
tically; speakers presuppose sentences (or propositions) pragmatically in the sense of taking
that sentence or proposition to be common ground (see Stalnaker 1970). It will be obvious
from context which use of ‘presuppose’ is intended, but the two notions should be kept
clearly distinct. In what follows I make standard assumptions about the presuppositions of
possessives, definite descriptions, clefts, and factives.
2 Modified slightly from Geurts 1996.
3 Following Geurts 1996.
4 At least since Karttunen & Peters 1979.
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argues that speakers reach this conclusion just in case the consequent of the
conditional in question is in some sense independent of its antecedent.
In this paper I argue that these broadly pragmatic lines of response to the
Proviso Problem are inadequate. I begin by explaining the responses in more
detail. Then I give a variety of cases in which speakers are felt to presup-
pose something unconditional even though the consequent of the predicted
conditional presupposition depends on its antecedent in ordinary ways and
there is no apparent independent source of pragmatic pressure to conclude
that the speaker is presupposing something unconditional. While cases like
this have been observed previously, they have been largely neglected in the
literature. These cases raise a prima facie challenge to the standard lines
of response to the Proviso Problem. I proceed to sharpen this challenge by
giving a novel kind of case in which speakers are felt to presuppose the
relevant unconditional even though there is strong pragmatic pressure to
take them only to be presupposing the predicted conditional presupposition.
I conclude that, in their current form, pragmatic approaches do not solve the
Proviso Problem.
2 C-theories
The predictions that lead to the Proviso Problem are as follows:5
(6) If p then qr .
 p ⊃ r
(7) p or qr .
 ¬p ⊃ r
(8) p and qr .
 p ⊃ r
For ease of discussion, I will focus on the first of these predictions, but
everything I say extends equally to the others.
I will refer to the class of theories that make predictions (6)-(8) as c-
theories (‘c’ for conditional).6 This class is wide and diverse enough that it
is easiest to delimit by exclusion rather than inclusion: nearly every major
theory of semantic presupposition makes these predictions, with the no-
table exception of the theory developed within the framework of discourse
5 With ‘’ standing for ‘semantically presupposes’.
6 The name is not meant to suggest an underlying structural similarity to the theories.
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representation theory (DRT ).7 The class of c-theories thus includes, most sig-
nificantly, satisfaction theory,8 as well as multivalent theories9 and a variety
of other theories.10
3 Responses to the Proviso Problem
The Proviso Problem, again, is the discrepancy between the predictions of
c-theories about the semantic presuppositions of conditionals, versus the
stronger, unconditional proposition that a speaker of a conditional is often
felt to presuppose. The existence of this gap — illustrated by examples like
(3) — is not per se an objection to c-theories. But insofar as c-theories are
meant to play a central role in a larger theory that accounts for what speakers
are typically felt to be presupposing when they assert certain sentences, it is
incumbent on defenders of c-theories to spell out how to bridge this gap.
There is no in-principle objection to the viability of such a story. It is open
to defenders of c-theories to argue that conditional sentences always have
conditional presuppositions, but that in some cases, for systematic pragmatic
reasons — reasons not specific to the domain of natural language — a speaker
of a conditional is felt to presuppose strictly more than that conditional’s
semantic presuppositions. This is the basic architecture of almost every
extant response to the Proviso Problem on behalf of c-theories.11 Spelled out
in slightly more detail:
7 van der Sandt 1989, 1992, Geurts 1996, 1999, Kamp 2001, and others. See below for brief
discussion of some other theories that avoid these predictions.
8 Satisfaction theory (the sobriquet is Geurts’s (1996)) is spelled out in Heim 1982, 1983, 1990,
1992, based on earlier work in Stalnaker 1973, 1974, Karttunen 1974, and since developed in
Beaver 2001, von Fintel 2008, Schlenker 2009, Rothschild 2011, and others.
9 Kleene 1952, Strawson 1952, van Fraassen 1969, Peters 1977, Karttunen & Peters 1979, and
more recently George 2008, Fox 2012.
10 E.g., Soames 1982, Schlenker 2008, Chemla 2008.
11 Stories of this kind have been sketched for instance in Karttunen & Peters 1979, Soames
1982, Heim 1990, Beaver 1992, 1999, 2001, Heim 2006, van Rooij 2007, Singh 2007, 2008,
von Fintel 2008, Fox 2011, Schlenker 2011, Lauer 2014. It is compatible with Basic Architecture
that the pragmatic reasoning in question is supported by a structured set of alternatives that
draws on more than purely pragmatic reasoning, as in the proposals of Schlenker and Singh.
Basic Architecture, as well as Independence, generalizes in obvious ways to conjunctions and
disjunctions.
13:4
Architecture of presupposition
(9) Basic Architecture: Conditionals always have conditional presupposi-
tions; but when S asserts a conditional of the form [If p then qr\, her
listener compares the relative plausibility of
i. S is presupposing just p ⊃ r ,12 versus
ii. S is presupposing r .
Her listener will conclude in favor of Option ii iff she has pragmatic
reasons to think that Option ii is more plausible.13
A closely related line of response runs as follows:
(10) Independence: Conditionals always have conditional presuppositions;
but a speaker who asserts [If p then qr\ is felt to presuppose r iff r is
in some sense independent of p; otherwise, she is felt to presuppose
only p ⊃ r .
It is natural to view Independence as an elaboration of Basic Architecture: there
is something weird about a conditional whose consequent is independent of
its antecedent, and this weirdness gives us pragmatic reason to think that
the speaker is not presupposing (just) that conditional. In the absence of this
pressure, however, we take the speaker only to be presupposing the relevant
conditional. However, some have also defended Independence without taking
on board Basic Architecture,14 and one could certainly take on board the
latter without the former; for this reason I will treat them separately in
what follows. One could also defend a combination of the views, so that
presupposed conditionals get strengthened iff they are independent or there
are other pragmatic pressures to do so. This would amount to one way of
spelling out Basic Architecture in more detail, and so I will not treat this as
a separate view in what follows; insofar as my arguments tell against Basic
Architecture, they tell against this combination of views as well.
12 In addition, of course, to any unrelated propositions she is felt to be presupposing.
13 And reason to think that this is common ground. Spelled out in slightly more detail: Option
i says that S accepts that after she makes her assertion, but before it is evaluated, p ⊃ r ,
but not r , will be common ground; Option ii says that S accepts that at that time r will be
common ground. See Stalnaker 2002 and von Fintel 2008 for relevant discussion of speaker
presupposition and accommodation. This kind of story is due in particular to Heim 2006;
similar proposals can be found especially in the works of Beaver, von Fintel, and Singh cited
above.
14 See especially Pérez Carballo 2009 and Lassiter 2012.
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The notion of independence which plays a central role in Independence
can be specified in a number of ways, as long as the specification fits into a
broader explanatory strategy.15
There are two main candidates in the literature. The first spells out in-
dependence in terms of probabilistic independence: r is independent of p
in this sense at a context c just in case Prc(r) ≈ Prc(r |p), where Prc(·) is
a contextually relevant probability measure.16 A second approach, given in
Pérez Carballo 2009, spells out independence in terms of the selection func-
tion associated with a Stalnaker conditional; call this sense of independence
conditional independence.17 r is conditionally independent of p at a context
just in case the context’s selection function includes a ¬r -world among the
closest p-worlds for any (¬p ∧¬r)-world in the context set.
The responses just summarized look promising when it comes to ex-
amples like the one we began with. There is a natural sense in which the
consequent of
(5) Theo hates sonnets ⊃ Theo has a wife.
15 One inadmissible specification of ‘independent’ is thus: r counts as independent of p in c
iff, when p ⊃ r is semantically presupposed by a conditional in c, it gets strengthened to r .
This is inadmissible for our purposes since it is obviously not explanatory. For this reason I
will not consider the view given in van Rooij 2007 here, since this is what his view seems to
amount to (for more discussion, see Mandelkern & Rothschild 2018).
16 This is the view endorsed in Schlenker 2011, citing Singh 2006; Lassiter 2012 endorses a
similar view, according to which strengthening takes place just in case Prc(r) ≥ Prc(r |p).
‘Strengthened’ or ‘strengthened/unconditional reading’ is a bit of sloppiness that I will go
in for here: of course the proposal is not that the semantic presupposition is replaced by
something stronger, but rather that something stronger (namely, the relevant unconditional)
is assumed to be presupposed by the speaker.
17 See Stalnaker 1968. Pérez Carballo’s argument turns crucially on the assumption that pre-
supposed conditionals are Stalnaker conditionals, not material conditionals. I will continue
to assume, contrary to Pérez Carballo but with most of the literature, that the conditional
presuppositions in question are material conditionals (though in discussion I will sometimes
approximate these with natural language conditionals). This assumption may be wrong,
and Irene Heim (p.c.) has suggested to me that careful attention to the way that conditional
presuppositions inherit the “flavor” of the asserted conditional may help explain some of
the data given below in a way friendly to c-theories. But my main points still go through if
we follow Pérez Carballo in amending this assumption. A simple way to see this, pointed
out to me by Pérez Carballo, is that the points I make here can be extended to disjunctions
and conjunctions, but it is uncontroversial that, according to c-theories, disjunctions and
conjunctions presuppose material conditionals, not Stalnaker conditionals.
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looks probabilistically and conditionally independent of the antecedent in
most contexts (although I admit that I am not exactly sure how to evaluate
these metrics). Independence thus seems to rightly predict that someone who
asserts
(3) If Theo hates sonnets, then so does his wife.
is felt to presuppose that Theo has a wife. A similar line of reasoning could
be spelled out within the more general framework of Basic Architecture.
There are many theoretical questions to ask about Basic Architecture and
Independence.18 There has been substantial work done towards answering
many of these questions in the papers cited above, and I would like to grant,
for the sake of argument, that they can be answered. The point I will make
here is that, even setting aside these theoretical worries, neither Independence
nor Basic Architecture provides an empirically adequate solution to the
Proviso Problem.
4 Unexpected strengthening
Trouble begins when we attend to a broader range of examples: examples in
which a conditional presupposition is strengthened even though, first, the
presupposition’s consequent straightforwardly depends on its antecedent,
and, second, there is no apparent independent source of pragmatic pressure
to strengthen the presupposition. Examples like these have been discussed
before, in Gazdar 1979 and Geurts 1996, 1999, but mostly neglected other-
wise.19 The goal of this section and the next is to show that these examples
continue to be problematic for the main responses which have been devel-
oped to the Proviso Problem: in particular, I argue that they make serious
trouble for Independence, and at least pro tanto trouble for Basic Architecture.
In Section 6 I give novel variants on these examples to make a more decisive
case against Basic Architecture.
18 See especially Geurts 1996; Geurts notes that someone who asserts a factive construction
like ‘Susie knows that if Theo hates sonnets, he has a wife’ is felt to presuppose only the
(independent) conditional ‘If Theo hates sonnets, he has a wife,’ not the strengthened ‘Theo
has a wife.’ Proponents of the present theory thus must explain why the predicted pragmatic
strengthening is blocked in cases like this.
19 Though see Soames 1982 and van Rooij 2007.
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4.1 Smith’s murder
Consider:
(11) [It is common ground that Smith has gone missing, and we don’t know
whether he is still alive. A detective enters and says:] If the butler’s
clothes contain traces of Smith’s blood, then it was the butler who
killed Smith.
The detective is felt to presuppose
(12) Someone killed Smith.
This is confirmed by my intuitions, by informants, and further by the ‘Hey
wait a minute’ (HWAM ) test:
(13) Hey wait a minute! I didn’t know someone killed Smith!
The felicity of a HWAM response indicates that the speaker has committed
herself to the content in question. The felicity of (13) as a response to (11)
thus suggests that the speaker of (11) has indeed committed herself to (12).
Now consider the predictions of the accounts sketched in the last section.
According to c-theories, (11) semantically presupposes:
(14) The butler’s clothes contain traces of Smith’s blood ⊃ Someone killed
Smith.
The consequent of (14) depends in a straightforward way on its antecedent.
Finding out that the butler’s clothes contain traces of Smith’s blood typically
should, and will, raise our credence that Smith was killed.20 Thus Indepen-
dence wrongly predicts that the speaker’s interlocutors will take the speaker
of (11) to be presupposing (14) alone, and not the stronger (12).
Independence thus makes the wrong prediction; does the more general
Basic Architecture do better? It is harder to assess the predictions of this
view, but it does not seem to me that it does any better. To assess this, we
must ask whether, when interlocutors compare
20 The consequent is plausibly conditionally dependent on the antecedent as well, though it is
hard to know how to get direct intuitions about this; in any case, this is true if conditional
independence is meant to track our intuitions about relevance, evidence, and causal relations,
as I take it it is.
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(15) The detective is presupposing Someone killed Smith.
versus
(16) The detective is presupposing The butler’s clothes contain traces of
Smith’s blood ⊃ Someone killed Smith.
they have general pragmatic reason to conclude in favor of the former, rather
than the latter.21 It is hard to see what pragmatic pressure there is to draw
this conclusion. When it comes to an example like (3), defenders of Basic
Architecture reason as follows:
The addressee asks what the speaker must be presupposing. . .
in order for the event to be a cooperative contribution to the
conversation. It would be absurdly implausible for the ad-
dressee to hypothesize that the speaker must have been pre-
supposing that either Theo doesn’t hate sonnets or is mar-
ried, but not presupposing either of the disjuncts. (Stalnaker
2014: 69)
By contrast, in the present case it is perfectly plausible to think that the
speaker is presupposing
(14) The butler’s clothes contain traces of Smith’s blood ⊃ Smith was
killed.
without presupposing the consequent or the negation of the antecedent.
Indeed, (14) seems like a fairly natural working hypothesis to attribute to the
detective — and, moreover, one that we can imagine her assuming without
making explicit.
4.2 An explanation from redundancy?
Considerations of overall plausibility thus do not seem to help here. A
slightly different approach to explaining why (14) gets strengthened to (12) is
21 Reasons apart, of course, from the fact that they know that a speaker of (11) is typically
presupposing (12). It is worth emphasizing that it is of course true that (15) is more plausible
than (16), and moreover that this is common knowledge among ordinary speakers, but these
are not facts that we can appeal to in explaining the data: these facts are precisely what we
are trying to explain.
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to appeal to general considerations about conversational practices.22 There
are different ways of pursuing this strategy; I will discuss here the route that
looks most promising to me, and argue that it does not succeed.
This route, suggested to me by an anonymous reviewer for this journal,
argues that considerations about redundancy can explain the pressure to-
wards a strengthened, unconditional reading in cases like (11). The idea is
that, in order to be felicitous, a speaker’s assertion must provide a sufficient
amount of new information, over and above what the speaker presupposes
and what we can gather from her presuppositions.23 Suppose, in the present
case, that we take the speaker to be presupposing only (14). It is natural to
assume that the speaker knows (14) because she knows that if the butler’s
clothes contain traces of Smith’s blood, then the butler killed Smith. If we can
gather this from (14), however, then the asserted content of (11) would add
nothing new beyond what we can gather from what the speaker presupposes.
By contrast, suppose we take the speaker to be presupposing (12). Then
(even though (12) entails (14)) there won’t be any reason to conclude that the
speaker knows (12) on the basis of knowing that if the butler’s clothes contain
traces of Smith’s blood, then the butler killed Smith (since this is, of course,
not by itself a basis for knowing that Smith was killed). Thus the asserted
content of (11) does indeed add something substantial beyond what we can
gather from the speaker’s presuppositions, and this contrast pressures us to
interpret the speaker as presupposing (12) rather than just (14).
The first way to evaluate this proposal is to test whether the relevant
sequence really does strike us as objectionably redundant by transforming it
into a sequence of assertions. Compare:
(17) Smith is dead; and if the butler’s clothes contain traces of Smith’s
blood, then it was the butler who killed him.
versus
(18) If the butler’s clothes contain traces of Smith’s blood, then Smith is
dead, and it was the butler who killed him.24
22 An avenue suggested to me by Irene Heim.
23 Or it must serve some other coordinating purpose, e.g., adding discourse referents.
24 Or equivalently: ‘If the butler’s clothes contain traces of Smith’s blood, then Smith is dead,
and if the butler’s clothes contain traces of Smith’s blood, then it was the butler who killed
Smith.’ This version sounds fine as well, if verbose. Since the relevant question for us is
about informational redundancy, and not verbosity, it seems to me that (18) is a better test
sentence; but I believe the present point goes through either way. Note that all three versions
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The present proposal leads us to expect that (18) will strike us as infelicitously
redundant, whereas (17) will not. But I do not detect any such contrast here,
nor do any informants I have run the pair by. This suggests that the present
line of reasoning is mistaken. Perhaps from (14) we can surmise that the
speaker is assuming that if the butler’s clothes contain traces of Smith’s
blood, then the butler killed Smith; but it is nonetheless unproblematic for
the speaker to proceed to assert what we have so far only surmised.
The fact that no intuition of redundancy surfaces when we test these
sequences provides some evidence that considerations about redundancy
do not play any role in pressuring interlocutors to strengthen (14) to (12),
and analogous tests point to the same conclusion in the cases I give below.
Nonetheless, it is possible that our judgments about these sequences change
when we translate them from a presupposition plus assertion (as in the
original case) to a series of assertions (as in the pair just given), and so we
should not treat this test as decisive.
We can, however, strengthen our case against the redundancy line of
reasoning by modifying our example slightly to ensure that the asserted
content adds substantial new information under both a conditional and an
unconditional reading. Consider this variant on (11):
(19) [It is common ground that Smith went missing last week, and we don’t
know whether he is still alive. A detective enters and asserts:] If the
butler’s clothes contain traces of Smith’s blood, then we’ll soon have
Smith’s murderer behind bars.
According to c-theories, (19), like (11), presupposes the conditional (14); but a
speaker of (19) is felt to presuppose the unconditional (12), just as for (11).
In this case, though, a redundancy-based story to explain the strengthening
of (14) to (12) does not get off the ground. Suppose that, on first hearing
(19), we take the speaker to be presupposing only (14). Then we may well
reason that she is presupposing this because she knows that if the butler’s
clothes contain traces of Smith’s blood, then the butler killed Smith. But even
if we can conclude this from her (conditional) presupposition, in this case
the asserted content still adds something new: namely that we would have
no trouble catching and arresting the butler. Thus there is no way to trace
are still felicitous with ‘moreover’ substituted for ‘and’, which further confirms the intuition
that these sequences are non-redundant (the ‘moreover’ test is attributed to class notes by
Orin Percus).
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a preference for an unconditional interpretation of (19) to a desire to avoid
interpreting the speaker as being redundant.
Of course, these considerations about (19) do not give us decisive evi-
dence about what pressures us towards an unconditional reading in (11), but
it strikes me as implausible that different mechanisms explain the strength-
ening in these two cases. In any case, we could simply focus on cases like (19)
to make our case against Basic Architecture.25
I conclude that the present line of response does not explain the strength-
ening of the presupposition of (11). I do not see a more promising approach,
and thus I do not see how to account for a case like this within the framework
of Basic Architecture. This does not mean there is no way to do so: it is
impossible to rule out that there is an explanation I am overlooking. My point
for now is simply that it is incumbent on defenders of c-theories to give an
explanation of cases like this, and that it is not clear how it would go.26
25 To make good on this, in what follows, wherever a worry about redundancy could be raised,
I footnote a variant of the case that controls for that worry.
26 A different way of attempting to use general conversational practices to explain the strength-
ening in question is to argue that, were we to impute to the detective the intention to
communicate only the conditional (14), we would treat her as presupposing something that
addresses an implicit question under discussion (QUD): something like how can we find
out whether Smith was killed?. This kind of conversational move is generally marked: QUDs
should be addressed by asserted, not presupposed, content. And so there is pressure to
avoid treating the speaker as presupposing (14). This line of response is fairly easy to
dismiss, however. Two observations are key here. First, (12) entails (14). Thus if (14) answers
QUDs in an objectionable way, then so does (12). Of course, this line of argument only goes
through if, as we are assuming, the presupposed conditional is a material conditional. But
even if we abandon that assumption, note that, second, in addition to whatever QUDs (12)
answers insofar as it entails (14), (12) also answers a further QUD: whether Smith is dead.
Thus, if the conditional reading of (11) were infelicitous on the grounds that it answers a
QUD with presupposed content, we would expect the unconditional reading to be even less
acceptable, since (12) answers every QUD that (14) does, and more. It follows, first, that we
cannot explain a selectional pressure for the unconditional over the conditional reading on
the grounds of the present considerations; if there is infelicity in this case having to do with
QUDs, then, if anything, this infelicity would pressure us towards the conditional rather than
the unconditional reading of (11), since the conditional answers strictly fewer QUDs than
the unconditional. But, second, the unconditional reading of (11) is perfectly felicitous; since
the unconditional reading inherits any QUD-related infelicity of the conditional reading, it
follows that there is no QUD-related infelicity for the conditional reading in the first place.
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5 More cases
In this section I will give a number of examples similar to (11) and (19). In
all these cases, the consequent of the predicted conditional presupposition
depends on its antecedent in ordinary ways, but nonetheless the speaker
is felt to take for granted the relevant unconditional. Thus Independence
makes the wrong predictions in each case. Moreover, it is hard to see how
a pragmatic story along the lines of Basic Architecture would explain the
relevant strengthenings.27 A redundancy-based approach will not work, for
the reasons sketched in the last section; and I do not see a more plausible
alternative.
I multiply cases here for two reasons. One is to reduce the likelihood of
unintended confounds in the cases given above. The other is to control for a
possible response to the present cases which holds that we can explain them
simply by cashing out the notion of “independence” in a different way. The
breadth of examples given here makes it hard to see how we can specify a
notion of independence which is sufficiently broad for Independence to make
the right predictions, but still fits naturally into a broader, explanatory theory
of communication.
5.1 Diabetes
(20) a. Is John in good health? Is he taking care of himself?
b. [I’m not sure, but we should be able to tell at dinner;] if he’s
restricting his sugar intake, then his diabetes is under control.
A speaker of (20b) will typically be felt to presuppose
(21) John has diabetes.
This is confirmed by intuitive judgments, as well as by the HWAM test. But
according to c-theories, (20b) presupposes the conditional
(22) John’s restricting his sugar intake ⊃ John has diabetes.
27 To evaluate this, of course, we need to spell out the contexts in which these utterances are
made; I give brief suggestions about this in what follows. One important point about these
examples, and the contexts I give for them, is that the inference I report is merited even
when the unconditional proposition in question is not already common ground before the
utterance. These examples thus are not vulnerable to the confound discussed in Katzir &
Singh 2013.
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In ordinary contexts, the consequent of this conditional seems to depend
in straightforward ways on the antecedent, and so Independence wrongly
predicts that (22) will not be strengthened to (21). Nor is it easy to see how
pragmatic considerations will lead to the conclusion that the speaker is
presupposing (21) rather than just (22).
5.2 Coats
(23) a. Why did some of the professors wear waterproof coats to work
today?
b. [I don’t know who did, and I can’t tell you for all of them, but]
if Jack wore his waterproof coat to work today, then he’s aware
that it’s raining out.28
A speaker who asserts (23b) will typically be felt to presuppose
(24) It’s raining out.
According to c-theories, (23b) presupposes
(25) Jack wore his waterproof coat to work today ⊃ It’s raining out.
The consequent of (25) is not independent of its antecedent in any relevant
sense, and so Independence wrongly predicts that it will not be strengthened
to (24). And again, it is hard to see how broadly pragmatic considerations
help explain this strengthening.
5.3 Baseball
(26) a. What were the kids up to today?
b. [I don’t know, but] if they were playing baseball in the back-
yard earlier, then they’re the ones who broke the dining room
window.29
Someone who asserts (26b) is typically felt to presuppose
28 A variant that controls for issues about redundancy: ‘[I don’t know who did, and I can’t tell
you for all of them, but] if Jack wore his waterproof coat to work today, then his stepsister
isn’t aware that it’s raining out. (She tries to sabotage his health by hiding his jacket when it
rains.)’
29 A variant that controls for issues about redundancy: ‘[I don’t know, but] if they were playing
baseball in the backyard earlier, then it wasn’t Aaron who broke the dining room window.’
13:14
Architecture of presupposition
(27) Someone broke the dining room window.
C-theories predict that the semantic presupposition of (26b) is
(28) The kids were playing baseball in the backyard earlier ⊃ Someone
broke the dining room window.
The consequent of (28) is not independent of its antecedent in any relevant
sense, and so Independence wrongly predicts that it will not be strengthened
to (27). And, again, it is hard to see how Basic Architecture helps here.
6 Strengthening the case against Basic Architecture
The considerations discussed up to this point constitute a strong case against
Independence, but only a pro tanto case against Basic Architecture: all they
show is that there are cases where it is unclear how Basic Architecture can
explain the data, and where an explanation is needed. This falls far short of a
clear argument that Basic Architecture is untenable. As I show in this section,
however, we can modify those cases to give a more probative argument
against Basic Architecture.
According to Basic Architecture, strengthening takes place through
domain-general pragmatic reasoning. Strengthening should thus be blocked
when there is strong pragmatic pressure against interpreting a speaker as
being committed to the relevant unconditional. But, as I show here, in some
cases the conditional presupposition posited by c-theories gets strengthened
even in the face of strong pragmatic pressure not to strengthen it.30
The following variant on (11), suggested to me by Danny Fox, illustrates
this point:
(29) [It is common ground that Susie has disappeared. The detective says:]
We don’t know where Susie is, or even whether she’s still alive. We
need to examine her room.
30 Geurts (1996: §3) makes a related point in his third objection to the Argument from truth-
functionality. Geurts’s cases differ from mine in that in his cases, the speaker asserts
the negation of the unconditional rather than avowing ignorance of it. This difference
strikes me as important, because it seems like the c-theorist will be able to explain on
independent grounds what is wrong with presupposing p ⊃ q and then denying q (and
thereby communicating in a very roundabout way that p is false). No similar explanation is
available in the case in which the speaker simply avows ignorance of q rather than denying
it.
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a. If there are bloodstains in the room, then Susie was murdered,
and Susie’s murderer did a sloppy job.
b. If there are bloodstains in the room, then Susie’s murderer did a
sloppy job.31
(29a) is a good continuation. But (29b) is quite peculiar. Intuitively the source
of the peculiarity is that in asserting (29b), the detective is presupposing that
Susie was murdered, contrary to his prior assertion that he doesn’t know
this.
There are two ways to confirm that this is, indeed, what accounts for the
oddity of (29b). First, note that
(30) Hey wait a minute! I thought that we didn’t know whether Susie was
murdered or not!
is a felicitous response to (29b), which suggests that the speaker of (29b)
does indeed communicate that Susie was murdered.
Second, compare a minimal variant of (29b) in which the speaker does
not deny that she knows whether Susie was murdered:
(31) [It is common ground that Susie has disappeared. The detective says:]
We need to examine Susie’s room. If there are bloodstains in the room,
then Susie’s murderer did a sloppy job.
(31) is felicitous. This suggests, again, that what renders (29b) unacceptable is
the tension between the detective’s avowal of ignorance about whether Susie
was murdered, and her felt presupposition that Susie was murdered.
These tests confirm the intuition that the speaker of (29b) is felt to presup-
pose that Susie was murdered. But this looks like the opposite of what Basic
Architecture predicts. According to c-theories, the semantic presupposition
of (29b) is:
(32) There are bloodstains in the room ⊃ Susie was murdered.
According to Basic Architecture, (32) can get strengthened to
(33) Susie was murdered.
31 A variant that controls for worries about redundancy: ‘If there are bloodstains in the room,
then Susie’s murderer is in prison as we speak. (We picked up a notoriously sloppy serial
murderer yesterday.)’
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if there is pragmatic pressure to do so. As with the examples above, it is
hard to find reasons which would favor this interpretation.32 But here we
can make a stronger point. Even if we are overlooking subtle pragmatic
reasons that tell in favor of strengthening (32) in this case, they should be
overwhelmed by the strong and general pragmatic pressure to interpret
speakers as having coherent commitments. But we can only interpret the
speaker of (29b) as having coherent commitments if we do not strengthen
(32). For if we strengthen (32), we take the speaker to be committed to the
propositions, first, that Susie was murdered, and second, that she doesn’t
know whether Susie was murdered, commitments which are incoherent.33
By contrast, if we take the speaker to be committed only to (32), then we
can interpret her as coherent: we will hear her as committed to exactly
the information expressed in (29a), which is felicitous. The prediction of
Basic Architecture in this case thus seems clear: namely, that (32) will not be
strengthened to (33). This is the wrong prediction.
Examples like (32) can be multiplied by giving appropriate contexts for
cases of the kind discussed earlier in this paper. For instance, consider this
variant of (20):
(34) a. [Tim:] I haven’t seen John in forever. I heard he has either diabetes
or arthritis. Do you know whether whatever he has is under
control?
b. [Jason:] I’m not sure; I actually don’t know what sickness he has,
either. But we should be able to tell by what he eats tonight.
(i) If he restricts his sugar intake, then he has diabetes, but it’s
under control.
(ii) If he restricts his sugar intake, then his diabetes is under
control.
(34b-ii) is infelicitous here. As in the case of (29b), we can diagnose this as
follows: Jason is felt to be presupposing what he has just said he doesn’t
know, namely that John has diabetes. This is confirmed by the fact that (35)
is a felicitous response to (34b-ii):
(35) [Tim:] Wait a minute! So he does have diabetes? I thought you just
said you don’t know what sickness he has?
32 Again, for the reasons given in Section 4, considerations about redundancy or QUDs will not
help explain the case.
33 In the sense in which Moore-paradoxical sentences are incoherent.
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Once more, however, this does not match the prediction of Basic Architecture.
C-theories predict that (34b-ii) presupposes
(36) John restricts his sugar intake ⊃ John has diabetes.
Basic Architecture predicts that (36) can be strengthened to
(37) John has diabetes.
if there is pragmatic pressure to do so. But we can preserve the coherence
of Jason’s discourse in this case only if we attribute to him just (36), and
not the stronger (37). In light of the strong, general pragmatic pressure to
interpret speakers as being coherent, Basic Architecture thus predicts that in
asserting (34b-ii), Jason is taken to presuppose only the conditional (36), not
the unconditional (37). But again, this is the wrong prediction: Jason is taken
to presuppose (37).
7 Prospects
I conclude that neither Independence nor Basic Architecture is by itself an
empirically adequate solution to the Proviso Problem. Nor will a combination
of these two approaches do any better, since such a combination would
inherit the problems for Basic Architecture sketched in the last section.
Before surveying a few possible avenues of response to the data I have
given, I note a key point that must be accounted for by any approach. I have
given cases in this paper where a conditional reading is felt to be unavailable,
but there are other, structurally very similar, cases where a conditional
reading is felt to be available. For instance, consider
(38) [It is common ground that there has been a monarchist rebellion in
Ukraine. An intelligence analyst says:] We don’t know whether Ukraine
has a king now or not. We need to consult our agents on the ground.
If the monarchist rebellion succeeded, then we need to make contact
with the new king of Ukraine as soon as possible.
(38) is structurally very similar to (29b) and (34b-ii). But, by contrast to those
cases, (38) does not strike us as incoherent: it seems that here we are willing
to accept a conditional reading of the semantic presupposition of (38). That
is, we are able to hear the speaker as committed only to the conditional
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(39) The monarchist rebellion succeeded ⊃ There is a king.
and not committed to the unconditional
(40) There is a king.
Note that (39) is non-trivial, since monarchies may have kings or queens, and
so some accommodation is required in this case. Yet, in contrast to the cases
discussed above — and in keeping with the predictions of Basic Architecture
and Independence — in this case we do not strengthen the conditional (39) to
the unconditional (40).
What is surprising, and worth emphasis here, is the existence of both cases
like those I gave above, where strengthening seems obligatory, and cases like
(38), where it isn’t. Cases like (38) have, of course, long been known in the
literature, and used to defend the predictions of c-theories; in developing
a response to the data given above, it is important to bear in mind that, in
cases like this, c-theories seem to get things right.
If c-theories are to be defended, however, it looks like a new approach
must be developed, either in concert with one of the two approaches dis-
cussed above or in place of them. An implicit assumption of Basic Architecture
is that presupposition accommodation will be as minimal as possible — that
is, that a speaker will be felt to presuppose exactly what is semantically
presupposed by what she says, unless there is some pragmatic pressure to
assume that she is presupposing something stronger. One way to defend
c-theories would be to reject this minimality assumption. The minimality
assumption fits very naturally into a broader theory of communication, how-
ever, and thus if we reject it, we need to spell out what should go in its
place, and how its replacement fits into a larger theory of communication.
These tasks look challenging. One approach would be to argue that there
is a strong cognitive preference for processing unconditional rather than
conditional propositions, a preference strong enough that it can override
rational pressure in favor of a conditional interpretation in many cases. If this
psychological hypothesis is correct, it should be possible to find independent
evidence for it in other domains.34
34 One attractive feature of this approach is that it might make sense of the contrast between
cases like those discussed here, versus cases like (38) in which a conditional reading is easily
available: on a first pass, it looks like we are willing to accept a conditional reading just in
case the conditional in question has the status of a common default in reasoning, which fits
naturally with this approach.
13:19
Matthew Mandelkern
A different response to the present considerations is to pursue theories of
semantic presupposition that do not make the weak conditional predictions
that distinguish c-theories (call such theories non-c-theories). At present
there is only one major non-c-theory on the market, namely DRT. DRT has
serious open problems of its own, though.35 A number of alternative non-c-
theories have been developed. Not all avoid the present criticisms, however.
In particular, as an anonymous reviewer for this journal points out, theories
according to which both a conditional and unconditional presupposition are
generated may be able to predict a default unconditional reading, and thus
explain the cases given in Sections 4 and 5; but insofar as those theories leave
it to pragmatics to select between a conditional and unconditional reading,
they cannot explain the cases given in the last section.36
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